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Abstract
We introduce a community network model which exhibits scale-free property and
study the evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG) on this network model.
It is found that the frequency of cooperators decreases with the increment of the
average degree k¯ from the simulation results. And reducing inter-community links
can promote cooperation when we keep the total links (including inner-community
and inter-community links) unchanged. It is also shown that the heterogeneity of
networks does not always enhance cooperation and the pattern of links among all
the vertices under a given degree-distribution plays a crucial role in the dominance
of cooperation in the network model.
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1 Introduction
Cooperation is an essential ingredient of evolution. Understanding the emer-
gence and persistence of cooperation among selfish players in evolution is one
of the fundamental and central problems. As one typical game, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game (PDG), has become a world-wide known paradigm for study-
ing the emergence of cooperative behavior between unrelated individuals. In
the original PDG, two players simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or
defect. The defector will always have the highest reward T (temptation to
defect) when playing against the cooperator which will receive the lowest pay-
off S (sucker value). If both cooperate they will receive a payoff R (reward
for cooperation), and if both defect they will receive a payoff P (punishment).
Moreover, these four payoffs satisfy the following inequalities: T > R > P > S
and T + S < 2R. It is not difficult to recognize that it is best to defect for
rational players to get the highest payoff independently in a single round of
the PDG, but mutual cooperation results in a higher income for both of them.
Therefore, this situation creates the so-called dilemma for selfish players.
To find under what conditions the cooperation emerges on the PDG, various
mechanisms of enforcing cooperation have been explored [1]. Departure from
the well-mixed population scenario, Nowak and May introduced a spatial evo-
lutionary PDG model in which players located on a lattice play with their
neighbors [2]. In each round, players adopt the strategy of their most success-
ful neighbors’ in term of their payoff. It has been shown that the spatial effect
promotes substantially the emergence of cooperation.
In the past few years, the evolutionary PDG has been studied on different
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network models such as small-world structure [3], regular and random graphs
by using other mechanisms to enhance cooperation [4,5,6,7,8]. In all these
models, each player occupies one vertex of the networks. The edges denote
links between players in terms of game dynamical interaction. Each player
just interacts with its adjacent players. Santos et al. have studied the PDG
and snowdrift game (SG) on scale-free networks [9] and found that cooper-
ation dominates in both the PDG and the SG, for all values of the relevant
parameters of both games [10]. Their results show that the heterogeneity of
networks favors the emergence of cooperation. In addition, Much attention
has been given to the interplay between evolutionary cooperative behavior
and the underlying structure [11,12].
In this paper, we focus on the PDG on community networks which can reflect a
lot of real-world complex networks such as social and biological networks. The
community network model and update rule for the PDG are introduced in Sec.
2. Simulation results are shown for some parameters and their corresponding
explanations are provided in Sec. 3. At last, conclusions are made in Sec. 4.
2 The Model
We first construct the evolving network model which exhibits community
structure and scale-free properties [13]. We assume that there is a total of
M (M ≥ 2) communities in the network model. The evolving model is de-
fined by the following steps: (1) Starting from m0 (m0 > 1) fully connected
vertices in each community; and at the same time, there is a inter-community
link between every two different communities. The vertex to which the inter-
community links connect are selected fixedly in each community (the red
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points in Fig. 1). (2) A new vertex is added to a randomly selected community
at each time step. The new vertex will be connected to m (1 ≤ m ≤ m0) ex-
isting vertices in the same community through m inner-community links, and
to n (0 ≤ n ≤ m) existing vertices in other M − 1 communities through inter-
community links (growth). (3) When choosing the vertices to which the new
vertex connects in the same communities through inner-community links, one
assumes that the probability pij that a new vertex will be connected to node
i in community j depends on the degree lij of that vertex: pij = lij/
∑
k lkj
; When choosing the vertices to which the new vertex connects in the other
communities through inter-community links, one assumes that the probabil-
ity pik that a new vertex will be connected to node i in the community k
(k 6= j) also depends on the degree lik of that vertex: pik = lik/
∑
i,k,k 6=j lik
(preferential attachment). After t time steps this algorithm produces a grape
with N = Mm0 + t vertices and [Mm0(m0 − 1) +M(M − 1)]/2 + (m + n)t
edges, in which older vertices in each community in the generation process are
those which tend to exhibit larger values of the connectivity. And the average
degree k¯ of the networks model is about 2(m+ n). For example, Fig. 1 shows
an initial network with M = 3 and m0 = 3. The degree-distribution of the
network model is shown in Fig. 2, and we observe that the degree distribution
obeys a power-law form.
The model is generated via growth and preferential attachment, then we set
up a system of N players arranged at the vertices of this network model.
Each player who is a pure strategist can only follow two simple strategies: C
(cooperate) and D (defect). In one generation, each player plays a PDG with its
neighbors. Let’s represent the players’ strategies with two-component vector,
taking the value s = (1, 0) for C-strategist and s = (0, 1) for D-strategist. The
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Fig. 1. The sketch graph of the model withM = 3 communities andm0 = 3. The red
dots are chosen to connect to each other between every two different communities.
total payoff of a certain player x is the sum over all interactions, so the payoff
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Fig. 2. The degree distribution of a network with N = 6000, M = 3, m0 = 3, m = 3
and n = 1.
Px can be written as
Px =
∑
y∈Ωx
sxAs
T
y , (1)
where Ωx is the set of neighbors of element x and A is the payoff matrix.
A =


R S
T P

 . (2)
Introduced by Nowak and May [2,14], the payoff matrix can be written as a
simplified version
A =


1 0
b 0

 , (3)
where b represents the advantage of defectors over cooperators and 1 < b < 2.
Therefore, we can rescale the game depending on the single parameter b.
After this, the player x will inspect the payoff collected by its neighbors in the
generation, and then update its strategy for the next generation to play by
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the following rule [10]. It will select one player y randomly from its neighbors.
Whenever Py > Px, player x will adopt the strategy of player y with probability
given by:
Wsx←sy = (Py − Px)/(Dk>), (4)
where k> = max{kx, ky} and D = T − S. And kx and ky are the connectivity
numbers of player x and y, respectively. We use a synchronous update, where
all the players decide their strategies at the same time. All pairs of players
x and y who are directly connected on the network model engage in each
generation of the PDG by using the update rule of Eq. (4).
3 Simulations and Discussion
In the following, we show the results of simulations carried out for a popula-
tion of N = 6000 players occupying the vertices of the networks with M = 3
same size of communities. The initial strategies (cooperators or defectors) are
randomly distributed with equal probability. Then more than 11000 genera-
tions are played to allow for equilibrium frequency of cooperators and defectors
which are achieved by averaging over the last 1000 generations. The simula-
tion results of the frequency of cooperators as a function of b for the PDG has
been shown. Moreover, each data point averages over 40 realizations of both
the networks and the initial conditions.
In Fig. 3, we show the results for the PDG on the network model for different
values of the average degree k¯. It shows that the higher the value of the average
degree k¯ = 2(m+n), the more unfavorable cooperation becomes, especially for
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Fig. 3. Frequency of cooperators for the PDG as a function of the parameter b for
different values of the average degree k¯. A, m0 = 2 and k¯ = 4; B, m0 = 3 and k¯ = 6;
C, m0 = 4 and k¯ = 8; D, m0 = 6 and k¯ = 12. The colored lines in each subgraph
correspond to different m and n for a fixed value of k¯, respectively.
a large value of the parameter b. From Fig. 3A to Fig. 3D, we have found that
the larger the value of the parameter m/n is, the more favorable cooperation
becomes over the large range of b when the average degree k¯ is unchanged.
Moreover, for small b, cooperation dominates in the PDG when the value of the
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Fig. 4. Frequency of cooperators in the PDG as a function of the parameter b for
different values of m, given a fixed value of n = 1.
Fig. 5. Frequency of cooperators in the PDG as a function of the parameter b for
different values of n, give fixed values of m = 3 and m0 = 3.
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parameter k¯ is small; however, the frequency of cooperators decreases rapidly
over the entire range of the parameter b when the value of the parameter k¯ is
high. Fig. 4 shows the frequency of cooperators as a function of b with different
m when we keep n = 1. The frequency of cooperators decreases when the value
of the parameter m increases for a given fixed b. Fig. 5 shows the frequency
of cooperators as a function of b with different n when we keep m = 3. The
frequency of cooperation decreases when the value of the parameter n increases
for a given fixed b.
From the simualtion results, we have found that the smaller the value of the
parameter k¯, the more favorable cooperation becomes; besides, the smaller
the value of the parameter m/n, the more unfavorable cooperation becomes
for a given fixed k¯. These results can be explained in the following ways. The
average degree k¯ of the network models can affect the frequency of coopera-
tors [10,15]. On this community network model, the small value of k¯ is benefit
to cooperation. On the one hand, the heterogeneity of the network structure
can promote cooperation; the direct inter-connections of hubs play an signifi-
cant role in enhancing cooperation [10,16,17,18]. On this network model, the
initial-fixed vertices connected to between each community are expected to be
the largest hubs in each community. We have found that these fixed vertices
are always hubs with largest degree in each community for small k¯ by data
analysis. However, if we increase the value of m or n, the expected hubs may
not have the largest connectivity any more, though the degree distribution
still obeys a power-law form. More and more older vertices would compete
to be the hubs for high k¯, and then the number of direct links among hubs
would decreases. It is because if there are no direct links connecting to any
two vertices belonging to different communities initially, they would become
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unconnected forever. Therefore, large m or n leads to the case that the num-
ber of direct links among hubs decreases. This would inhibit cooperation since
the number of direct links among larger hubs from different communities de-
creases. On the other hand, higher connectivity should reduce cooperation;
in particular, more cooperation should emerge if connectivity is low [15]. Our
simulation results confirm this conclusion. When we increase the value of m
or n, players will have more neighbors, but having more neighbors for players
does not pay at all. Beacuse it would lead the community network to the high
connectivity, and then the cooperative behaviour becomes inhibited.
It is well-known that scale-free networks promote cooperation [10]. And scale-
free networks have most of their connectivity clustered in a few vertices, like
the amplifier structures, such as loops and circulations which are potent for
cooperation [19]. While for a given fixed k¯, the best one for promoting coop-
eration is to keep n = 0. In this situation, it apparently becomes to be similar
to three hubs which are connected to each other. And all the newly growing
vertices only connect to other vertices belonging to the same community. Each
community is a standard BA scale-free network, so the whole network consists
of amplifier structures to promote cooperation. As the ratio m/n decreases,
the inner-community links number decreases and the inter-community links
number increases. Due to the community structure, in general, the vertices
in different communities may not have direct links connecting to each other,
then these vertices from different communities do not form loops through inter-
community links. As a result, the number of loops on the community network
decreases and the whole network does not favor cooperation. Therefore, when
the ratio m/n decreases for a fixed k¯, the cooperation becomes unfavorable.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the small number of links on this community
11
networks can promote cooperation by considering these factors. Community
sturcture is an ubiquitous phenomena in all kinds of complex networks, es-
pecially in human society. From our results, taking account into the effect of
community structure, some certain community structures promote coopera-
tion greatly; besides, different patterns of links among all the vertices under
a given degree-distribution can affect cooperation, especially connections be-
tween hubs can enhance cooperation greatly. Moreover, we have confirmed
that all the simulation results are valid for different population size N and
community size M .
4 Conclusions
To sum up, we have studied the cooperative behavior of the evolutionary
PDG on the community networks and found that reducing inner-community
and inter-community links can promote cooperation. The heterogeneity of net-
works is not always positive to enhance cooperative behavior and the situation
of connections among all the vertices, especially some certain structures and
direct connections between hubs plays a more significant role in the dominance
of cooperation. Graph topology plays a determinant role in the evolution of
cooperation [20]. However, it is necessary to explore more direct and essential
factors that facilitate cooperation to dominate for future work.
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